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<th>Abstract and/or Summary of Findings</th>
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<td>Cohen, David. &quot;Seeking justice on the cheap: is the East Timor tribunal really a Model for the future?&quot; (2002).</td>
<td>Describes the under resourcing of the Dili District Court, and argues that justice &quot;on the cheap&quot; shouldn't be the goal of future hybrid tribunals by describing the challenges faced by the judiciary, the prosecutor's office, and the defense.</td>
<td>Interviews, institutional and functional analysis</td>
<td>Proceeding with trials on the cheap undermines fair trial standards. If the UN is establishing a hybrid tribunal, it should set up both prosecution and defense under direct UN administrative control so as to ensure adequate defense resources. This is the model used at the ICTR and the ICTY, and it should be followed everywhere the UN engages. The UN should not commit itself to achieving a tribunal that is willing to compromise the integrity of an institution to which it attaches its name.</td>
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<td>Stahn, Carsten. &quot;Accommodating individual criminal responsibility and national reconciliation: the UN Truth Commission for East Timor.&quot; American Journal of International Law 85, no. 4 (2001): 952-966.</td>
<td>The population of East Timor has been subjected to severe human rights violations, in both the near and the more distant past. 1 Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony and non-self-governing territory under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter on December 7, 1975, after a period of civil turmoil and political instability marked by parallel claims to independence and calls for integration into Indonesia. 2 The Indonesian invasion brought with it massive violations of human rights and the laws of war. 3 Military clashes between the independence movement FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria do Timor-Leste Independente) and Indonesia continued on a large scale until 1979, though rebellion against Indonesian rule generally persisted for the whole period of Indonesian occupation. Beginning in January 1999, pro-Indonesian militia, supported by Indonesian security forces.</td>
<td>Literature review, interviews with court officials</td>
<td>The Serious Crimes Unit of the Dili District Court suffered from a premature UN transfer of control to inexperienced East Timorese judiciary, the failure of capacity-building programs, and domestic politicking. Many of the SCU's failings can also be attributed to the UN's &quot;persistent failure to consult in a genuine and meaningful way with the East Timorese,&quot; its &quot;bureaucratic and inflexible institutional nature,&quot; and contradictions in the role of the UN, whose staff was often overstretched, inexperienced, and disorganized. The court's impact on local populations was jeopardized by its failure to value local participation, and its jurisprudence was laid open to criticism by its failure to uphold due process standards. &quot;The slow pace and questionable quality of [UNTAET's] investigations... has resulted in a loss of confidence among the East Timorese in UNTAET's ability or will to bring perpetrators to justice.&quot; However, its move towards &quot;Timorisation&quot;! has led to East Timorese gradually being moved into leadership positions in the court, which should be considered a success despite some of the qualitative inadequacies of some of the trials.</td>
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<td>Strossmeyer, H., 2000, September. Building a New Judiciary for East Timor: Challenges of a Fading Nation. In Criminal Law Forum (Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 259-285). Kluwer Academic Publishers.</td>
<td>Descriptive account of the lead up to the establishment of the new Timorese judicial system, and presents challenges and opportunities for sustained judicial development.</td>
<td>Legal and institutional analysis, literature review</td>
<td>Despite the apparent scale of the task, the viability of the East Timorese judiciary will ultimately depend on a number of very practical but urgently needed steps. These steps include: (1) the intensive training and mentoring of East Timorese lawyers; (2) the provision of legal aid and other measures ensuring equal access to justice; (3) the development of institutional safeguards for the independence of the judiciary; (4) the establishment of inclusive mechanisms to amend the legislative framework of East Timor; (5) the integration of customary law and traditional forms of dispute resolution; and, most notably, (6) the prosecution and trial of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.</td>
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<td>Strohmeyer, Hansjoerg. &quot;Policing the peace: Post-conflict judicial system reconstruction in East Timor.&quot; UNSWJ 24 (2001): 171.</td>
<td>The tragic events in East Timor, the Security Council, by Resolution 1272 established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET is entrusted with overall responsibility for the administration of the territory of East Timor, and is specifically empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority in East Timor, including the administration of justice.</td>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Literature review, interviews with court officials</td>
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| Under the trusteeship of the United Nations, East Timor is inching its way towards independence. The challenges faced by the East Timorese and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor cannot be overstated. A nation has had to be built from out of the ruins left after the violence of September 1999 which followed the overwhelming public rejection of autonomy within Indonesia in the historic referendum of August 1999. One of the pillars of a successful state is a properly functioning criminal legal system that is, and is publicly perceived to be, fair and just. This paper examines the establishment of a criminal legal system in East Timor, and its viability, through several key laws and identified themes. In a situation where a people have endured massive violations of human rights in the course of their exercise of the right to self-determination, the process of dealing with those atrocities will have a profound effect on the emerging state and its long-term political and social stability. This examination therefore places particular emphasis on the process that has been chosen by the United Nations Transitional Administration for prosecuting atrocities committed in East Timor through the District Court of Dili. Exciting, ground-breaking work is being done by the United Nations Administration in East Timor, and its efforts to establish a criminal justice system are rich in both achievements and lessons to be learnt. | These are some of the other conclusions pertaining to the serious crimes process:
• Legitimacy: The credibility crisis suffered from the beginning by the serious crimes regime in turn led to serious problems of legitimacy. Complaints were frequently heard that the Special Panels convict only persons from Timor-Leste, while the Indonesians remain unpunished.
• Fairness: One of the most serious concerns in terms of performance lies in the quality of defense counsel available to the accused. The notable lack of adequate quality in the representation of the accused in many cases in Timor-Leste casts doubt on the credibility of the whole process. Given that there was already something of a crisis of legitimacy in relation to the process, the perception that a conviction was more or less a fait accompli in most cases as a result of the lack of adequate representation was a further serious setback.
• Impact: One proposed benefit of the Timorese model was its proximity to the victims, which would in principle make the pursuit of justice a more meaningful exercise, not only to the few witnesses in specific cases but to the country as a whole. It is widely recognized that wherever possible, the interests of justice and especially the interests of victims will be best served if trials occur in the country where the crimes were committed. However, the risks associated with failure, especially in the context of elevated expectations, may be more significant in the case of in-country trials than extrajudicial ones. The overall failure of the process to establish accountability in respect of those bearing the greatest degree of responsibility has meant that rather than making the pursuit of justice a meaningful national experience, it has simply served to make failures more obvious and the bitter pill of impunity harder to swallow.
• Overall efficiency: The serious crimes process can be regarded as a success in at least one regard—the speed with which it was able to investigate and prosecute cases. After four years it indicted almost 400 people. It held 35 trials and 48 people were convicted and two acquitted. On the face of it this compares favorably to the rate of progress in the ICTY, where in more than 10 years just over 130 people have been indicted in approximately 70 indictments.
• Legacy: The international presence within the judicial system in Timor-Leste has left only a limited legacy, and many additional steps will be needed to rebuild Timor Leste's judicial system. |

| This paper seeks to analyze the serious crimes process (the Special Panels and the Serious Crimes Unit) the UN established in Timor-Leste to try serious violations of human rights perpetrated in 1999. This mechanism finished its work in May 2005, and this paper provides an overall analysis in its aftermath. It is part of a series that aims to provide information and analysis on policy and practical issues facing hybrid trials, including:
• A brief history of the conflict and the nature of the atrocities in Timor-Leste
• Background to the establishment of the Special Panels and Serious Crimes Unit
• Analysis of the Special Panels
• Analysis of the Serious Crimes Unit
• Jurisdiction and legal framework
• The capacity of the Defence and issues of fairness
• Efficiency and funding
• Outreach and public perceptions
• Domestic ownership and political support
• Relationship with the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
• Legacy
• Completion strategy and future of the serious crimes process | Informant interviews, institutional analysis, qualitative impact evaluation

| A discussion of the interplay of different concepts of justice and reconciliation in United Nations peace operations in Timor Leste and in the Timorese political leadership. Drawing on research into norm diffusion and concepts of localization and norm contestation to understand how societies deal with their violent past under the auspices of international actors in UN peace operations, the analysis challenges the UN’s functionalist concept of transitional justice as a precondition to state- and nation building in post-conflict societies. As the case of Timor Leste demonstrates, the Timorese leadership has been successful in promoting its own concept of justice and reconciliation, leading to a localized version of state- and nation building that openly contests international approaches. | The fact that the complementary approach to transitional justice is based within the respective country enhances the possibilities for domestic actors to interfere in the justice process and to render an internationally designed agenda meaningless. At the same time weak post-conflict infrastructure makes even more ownership on the part of international actors necessary, which was not granted in the case of Timor Leste. For Timor Leste this means that an institutionalization of norms of transitional justice concerning victims’ rights on the domestic level will require a new generation of leaders who are willing to overcome the narrow definition of national identity based on the “valorization of resistance.” |